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The Seduction of Agelessness 
   
Recently when someone asked me what I was currently working on, I paused for a moment and 
replied: "you are not only as old as you feel, you are also as old as you are."  What I meant by this 
truism was both obvious and not. One of the more successful and subtle mechanisms through which 
ageism operates in our culture is in our redefinition of certain - desirable - types of old age as 
"young."  Rather than regarding the internal and external aspects of ourselves as inextricably bound 
together, part of an integrated whole which comprises our being, we compartmentalize them, 
imposing upon them a false dualism.  We conceptualize the ageing process as one in which there is 
an increasing conflict between two camps: on the one side, our corpus, which drags us inevitably 
into our dreaded old age, and on the other, our spirit, which remains forever young.  We then tell 
ourselves that if our bodies must to grow old - an issue to which science is still attending - we can at 
least retain our youthful spirit.  Thus old age disappears.  But this is an artificial dissection, and one 
which causes us to cut ourselves off from ourselves.  "I am (only) as old as I feel" allows us to 
believe we can transcend age; indeed it is the product of a society which tells us that age - old age -
is something to be transcended, if at all possible.  
 
The Elimination of Old Age: 'Passing' in the Academy 
The last twenty years has seen a dramatic increase in research on ageing. Many different 
explanations for this revived interest have been offered, most of which relate to the creation of 
needs brought about by demographic changes.  Moreover, it is projected that the demographic 
shifting that has already begun will only accelerate: by 2025, the proportion of British people aged 
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between seventy-five and eighty-four is forecast to increase by fifty per cent (Radford 1998).  One 
response to this demographic change has been a movement in studies on ageing towards 
"agelessness."  Age as a category in itself, it is argued, is obsolete; old age is thus merely a 
psychological state.   While all the stages of the life cycle are socially and culturally constructed 
(Harevan 1995), there is not much serious discussion about eliminating infancy, adolescence or 
adulthood from the developmental landscape.  It is only old age which comes under the scalpel.  
Why?  Why is this such an appealing strategy to so many? 
 
Bytheway (1995) makes the case for eliminating the category of old age, concluding his book 
Ageism with a chapter entitled "No more 'elderly', no more old age."  It is, he states, "indisputable 
that a rethinking of ageism cannot be based upon the presumption that old age exists" (p.115)  Old 
age is "a cultural concept, a construction that has a certain popular utility in sustaining ageism 
within societies that need scapegoats" (p.119).  Surely, old age is not only this (though it is also 
this).  Will eliminating the category simultaneously eliminate the dynamics of the oppression?  We 
do not fight sexism or racism solely by challenging the existence of the categories of sex and race 
(though these, too, are social constructs, and as such remain contested territory). Bytheway 
challenges the analogy between ageism on the one side and racism and sexism on the other (made 
by Butler in his original definition of ageism).  Bytheway addresses this issue in the following way: 
"the equivalence is no basis for a definition. As soon as that is agreed..." (p. 117). He asserts his 
view while offering no substantive discussion of it. But the point he makes is not self-evident and 
requires argument if it is to be sustainable. While there are admittedly ways in which ageism, 
sexism and racism are distinct, there are also similarities between them, most importantly though 
not only the power dynamic which Butler identified. 
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Perhaps what sets ageism apart from sexism and racism is its potent element of self-hatred.  People 
who behave in a racist or sexist manner will probably never be members of the group which is the 
target of their discrimination.  The categories of race and sex are relatively constant, though sex 
changes and skin pigmentation operations do exist.  Ageism is unique in that those who practice it 
will one day join the group they presently discriminate against, if longevity is granted them.  People 
regularly do all sorts of things to prolong their lives, though they hope and perhaps at some level 
believe that that extended life will not encompass old age.  How can these thoughts co-exist in the 
same person?  Why do they not experience any cognitive dissonance?  Fighting against ageism 
would on the face of it seem to be in every person's self interest, or at least every person who hopes 
to live a long life.  Why is this not so?  The key lies in the ability of people to see old people not as 
an extension of their future (or even present) selves, but rather as totally apart from themselves.  
   
Simone de Beauvoir writes passionately about the cost of this cutting off of ourselves from 
ourselves: 
 When we look at the image of our own future provided by the old we do not believe it: an 
absurd inner voice whispers that that will never happen to us - when that happens it will no 
longer be ourselves that it happens to. [...] 
 
 We must stop cheating: the whole meaning of our life is in question in the future that is 
waiting for us.  If we do not know what we are going to be, we cannot know what we are: let 
us recognize ourselves in this old man or in that old woman. It must be done if we are to take 
upon ourselves the entirety of our human state. (1970: 11-12) 
DeBeauvoir's plea against the entrenched "us" and "them" age distinctions is an important one.  She 
is not arguing, as Bytheway does, that old age does not exist, but rather that there is a continuity of 
being between ages.  Bytheway states old age does not exist as anything other than a social 
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construct because it lacks a clearly identifiable beginning and end.  This distinction, however, 
seems arbitrary and inappropriate.  Anything which involves a transformation - of which ageing is 
the epitome - does not, by definition, have clearly distinct beginnings and endings. A caterpillar 
becomes a butterfly, but we do not challenge the existence of the category of caterpillar or butterfly 
simply because of the gradual nature of the transformation.  And why should we? What is to be 
gained by it?  Bytheway argues against the existence of old age because he believes it is the 
cornerstone upon which ageism is propped, but this is to confuse the target of discrimination with 
the discrimination itself.  The pretense that old age does not exist, the belief that we can somehow 
wish it away, is the ultimate seduction of agelessness, but it comes at a great cost, as de Beauvoir 
reminds us, for it strips us of our own future.  
 
If old age is, stereotypically, a time of social withdrawal often accompanied by depression, then 
"successful ageing"  - a term which appears time and again in the literature on aging - is its antidote. 
 While statistically older people do not suffer from depression any more or less than other age 
cohorts (Murphy 1993:94), they are often perceived as doing so.  Not surprisingly, then, a strategy 
often advocated for combatting this supposed ailment, is to stay active.  The central premise of 
"successful ageing" theories does not differ substantially from that of its ancestor, activity theory: 
stay active and keep impending depression at bay.  The covers of two books, both entitled 
Successful Aging (Gingold 1992; Neuhaus and Neuhaus 1982) are revealing.  In the first there is a 
picture of a tanned, fit couple, one of whom is holding a tennis racket.  In the second, there is a 
picture of a couple both with their bicycles, he holding two books and she with lilacs in her bike 
basket.  The message is clear: if you are active and fit, and you will remain happy, not to mention 
romantically fulfilled, all your years.  Gingold identifies the purpose of his book: "to encourage 
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success in all aspects of later life" (p.2) and he organizes his discussion under headings such as 
improved health and fitness, mental soundness, social satisfaction, general feeling of well-being and 
satisfaction with life.  Surely this is a rather tall order to fill. Imagine reading a book which claimed 
to "encourage success in all aspects of life": mission amorphous, mission impossible. The only 
reason Gingold's stated purpose is palatable, in as much as it is, is because its prescriptions are 
limited to "later life" - that never, never land for which we do not have the same expectations as we 
do for the other phases of life which are, collectively, taken as the norm.  Neuhaus and Neuhaus 
state that successful ageing depends largely on "attention to healthy attitudes and activities in later 
life" (p.234) and describe general well-being in terms of "happiness, morale, life satisfaction, 
success" (p. 233).  Again, isn't this a rather tall order?  Haim Hazan, who refers to successful ageing 
as "the patronizing instruction of aged persons for better and fuller lives" (1994:15), comments 
"Though it is doubtful whether one can meaningfully speak of general satisfaction, in the case of 
the aged it is considered appropriate to pose such questions and to expect reasonable and valid 
answers" (p.21).  Various studies have showed that the very language which people use to speak 
with those they consider to be elderly is different from that which they use amongst the not-old 
(Coupland, Coupland and Giles 1991:16).  Care-givers and volunteers with the elderly, for instance, 
tend to use more questions and repetitions and employ simpler syntax in their conversation with old 
people, arguably indicating an assessment of lower intellectual abilities (Ashburn and Gordon 1981; 
Rubin and Brown 1975).  Similarly, researchers can ask questions to old people which, if applied to 
their own lives, they would find incomprehensible only because the psychological chasm between 
"us" and "them" is so fully entrenched.       
 
"Successful ageing" is based upon the concept of adaptation, whereby an individual's progress is 
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measured by the extent to which he/she conforms to the needs of the existing society.  This, in turn, 
is in part a reflection of how adequately the individual can fill his or her expected role in society. 
Such a concept is, then, wholly void of social structural critique. An individual is judged as making 
it or not according to his or her ability to conform.  Hazan argues that it is this measurement of 
adaptation which lies at the core of constructions of "life satisfaction."   
 
The unspecified but clearly preferred method of successful ageing is, by most accounts, not to age 
at all, or at least to minimize the extent to which it is apparent that one is aging, both internally and 
externally.  The "mask of ageing" theory rests on the assumption that there exists "a distance or 
tension ... between the external appearance of the face and body and their functional capacities, and 
the internal or subjective sense or experience of personal identity which is likely to become more 
prominent in our consciousness as we grow older" (Featherstone and Hepworth 1989: 151).  The 
'mask' which is referred to is, obviously, the one which life gives us as we age, the material signs of 
our physical aging.  The concept of the mask only works if one presumes a dichotomy between 
what is showed and what lies beneath the skin.  Hepworth (1991) refers to "an experiential 
difference between the physical processes of ageing, as reflected in outward appearance, and the 
inner or subjective 'real self' which paradoxically remains young" (p. 93).  What is being argued for 
here is implicitly a defense of the Cartesian mind/body split, a construction which has come under 
severe attack in many areas of study - but not that of old age.  Despite being cloaked in the jargon of 
postmodernism, this theory appeals to the common sense notion that many old people say they feel 
young inside.  But if and when they do say this, what exactly does it mean?  To argue that there is a 
"youthful self trapped beneath an ageing mask" (Biggs 1997: 566) is a manifestation of the very 
splitting Simone de Beauvoir identified: "that will never happen to us - when that happens it will no 
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longer be ourselves that it happens to."  Although I may look like someone that that has happened 
to, in fact I am not, for though you cannot see it, inside I am still young.  It's a catch twenty-two 
situation: depressed, disengaged old people are described as old, while those who defy this 
stereotype, who retain a passion for life, are considered young, if only in spirit. This splitting 
operates on two axes: it is between people, separating those who are really old from those who 
merely look it, and it is within people, imposing a schism between the inner and outer self. This 
second split, between external and internal age, is the basis of the mask of ageing theory.   
 
I Don't Feel Old: The Experience of Later Life, the very title of which reflects this splitting, 
purports to be about "later life from the inside" (p.1).  The study attempts to confront stereotypes 
about ageing as "an unavoidable process of retreat, of withdrawal into passivity" (p. 1) - in short, 
challenges the theory of disengagement. The good news that it comes up with is that ageing, that 
awful process of deterioration, doesn't happen to us on the inside.  The argument goes something 
like this: ageing is a state of mind, these people don't feel old, so at some level they are not old.  
Respondents' resistance to being called old is perceived, not as a form of self-hatred, but as an 
indicator of a positive self-identity in the context of the ageist environment in which they live. 
 Given that the stereotypes and associations are largely negative, dissociation of oneself from 
the category of old age might be a very reasonable position to adopt: for who would want to 
be associated with negative attitudes or prejudice, especially if one knew they were not true 
of one's own self or life?... a degree of pretence, denial, dissociation, and disconnection ... 
could even be regarded as a commendable form of resistance to the pressures and injustices 
of the prejudices against the old (1990: 122) 
While the authors identify pervasive negative social attitudes towards ageing, they do not challenge 
them.  It is hardly surprising that as products of an ageist society, many old people are themselves 
ageist. Upon reaching old age, they try to distance themselves from this group: a desperate plea for 
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personal exceptionalism, which challenges not the ageist stereotype, but rather its application to 
themselves.  The authors remark upon a tendency amongst their respondents "to think of 'old 
people' as 'other' than themselves, someone else at some other age, never oneself at whatever age 
one might be" (p.128).  References to "the old folks" - clearly indicating a group to which the 
speaker does not perceive him or herself as belonging - are often made by people who themselves 
are old by conventional standards.  The authors of the study conclude that their respondents "almost 
unanimously did not think of themselves as old " (p. 108).  Key to understanding this tendency is to 
decipher precisely what the respondents mean by the word 'old.'  Unfortunately this is not a subject 
which receives much attention in this study, though the authors do comment that by the term 'old 
age' respondents seem to mean "a combination of incapacity, inability and ill-health" (p.128). Other 
research has also suggested that the elderly tend to assimilate society's devalued appraisals of old 
people (Bengston, Reedy and Gordon, 1985).  Is it really any wonder, then, that respondents say 
they do not identify themselves with this category?  What rational, non-depressive person would?  
Seen in this light, the findings of the study are less illuminating than they might appear at first.   
 
Internalization of self-hatred - in this case the ageism of the old - is a response commonly adopted 
by members of an oppressed group, and it is this which leads  people to try to pass as being of 
another group. "They separate themselves from those "others," the old people. They are youthful." 
(Healey 1994: 82)  But this strategy is limited because it is built on pretense:  one is required to 
deny who and what one is, which is ultimately disempowering.  Moreover, while such a strategy 
may in a limited sense be affirming for the person who employs it, fundamentally it is at the 
expense of others.  At best, one has made an exception for oneself which is based on an illusion, 
and which leaves fully in tact the larger structure of oppression. 
 For all people who try to pass the price is high.  In passing you are saying that who you are at 
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60, 70, 80 is not o.k.  You are o.k. only to the degree that you are like someone else, someone 
younger, who has more value in the eyes of others. (Healey 1994: 82)   
Trying to "pass" is ultimately "participating in your own 'erasure'" (Healey 1994: 83).  With 
'passing' it is not the existence of the category which is being contested, but rather one's inclusion in 
it.  One embraces the dominant group in the desperate, and usually futile hope that one can be 
considered amongst its ranks.  But one will never belong there, can never belong there. The dignity 
of the self is replaced by a secret self-loathing. 
 
"Passing" as young is particularly tempting in a culture such as our own when youth itself appears 
to be for purchase.  Indeed, the entire multimillion dollar "beauty industry" - $50 billion annual 
spenditure on cosmetics and dieting in the U.S. alone  (Wolf 1990) - is built upon this principle. 
Betty Friedan comments: 
 How long, and how well, can we really live by trying to pass as young? By the fourth face-lift 
(or third?) we begin to look grotesque, no longer human. [We are] Obsessed with stopping 
age, passing as young ... Seeing age only as decline from youth, we make age itself the 
problem - and never face the real problems that keep us from evolving and leading 
continually useful, vital, and productive lives.  Accepting that dire mystique of age for others, 
even as we deny it for ourselves, we ultimately create or reinforce the conditions of our own 
dependence, powerlessness, isolation, even senility (1993: 25-26). 
In the end, our desperate attempts at passing are always bound to fail, for they are targeted at 
ourselves.  We physically transform ourselves until we are unrecognizable, and still we do not win 
the elusive battle.  We cannot win it, for as we wage this war, we destroy ourselves.  Oblivious to 
the sources of our strength in age and to the possibility of self-renewal, we blindly create and 
sustain the conditions of our own self censorship, and ultimately of our own defeat.  
 
Our youth-oriented society has taught us that as we age, there is an ever-increasing chasm between 
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what we look like on the outside and what we feel like inside.  One ageing woman describes her 
experience of going to a plastic surgeon. 
 He told me he would make me less strange to myself.  I would look more like I felt! I became 
frightened by the whole process.  Who was I then? This face? What I felt like inside? How 
come the two images were not connected? (Healey 1994:81) 
Indeed, why aren't the two images connected?  The entire cosmetics industry is founded on the 
principle that there is a disparity between body and soul, and that with time, the distance between 
the two only grows.   We do what we can to cling to that part of ourselves which remains "young," 
fearful of our own ageing, fearful of our own selves and of what we are becoming.  In the 
description above, one senses a woman who is torn within herself, who suffers the pain of a socially 
induced schizophrenia. She can neither stay the same as she has been, for physical aging is 
inevitable, nor, having internalized the values of an ageist culture, can she move forward and 
embrace her future as an old person.  The battle between body and soul is full blown, and she does 
not know which of these two selves is genuine.  Such a predicament is impossible, and can only be 
resolved by a complete restructuring of "the problem."  If we are to move beyond this paralytic 
state, we must battle against the Cartesian split, and embrace in its stead a new way of thinking 
about ageing, one which is founded upon the premise of an integrated body and mind which coexist 
in one and the same being.         
 
John Cage, the celebrated modern composer, explains that ageing has given him a new appreciation 
for the interrelationship between body and mind. 
 ...I now see that the body is part and parcel of the whole being.  There isn't a split between the 
mind and the body; they both belong together.  When I was younger, I mistreated the body 
because I thought the mind was what I was really dealing with.  But as I get older I see that 
I'm dealing quite straightforwardly with the body and that I must keep it in good working 
order as long as I can (Berman and Goldman 1992: 31). 
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Cage realizes that he cannot continue to produce his music if his body does not function.  He must 
take care of the one to protect the other, it is as simple as that.  The belief in the myth of the chasm 
between body and mind is an indulgence which the old cannot afford, except at great price.  And 
this, for Cage at least, is the lesson of age: we are embodied selves. 
     
Against Agelessness 
Betty Friedan, in The Fountain of Age (1993) describes the pain of the journey she took to 
accepting her own ageing.  She began, as many people do, deeply embedded in an ageist ideology, 
but ultimately she moved to a very different position. "Now that I could honestly think about 'them' 
as 'us' I came to realize that the fountain of age didn't mean, can't mean, the absence of 
physiological, emotional, or situational change (1993:xxviii).  Throughout the life cycle, change 
and continuity weave an intricate web.  As we meet the new challenges, both physical and 
psychological, with which our lives confront us, so then we are changed, even as we remain the 
same.  Old age is no different from the other stages of life in this regard.  The changes are many and 
real; to deny them, as some do in an attempt to counter ageism, is folly.     
 
Why is it that so often attempts to speak about ageing in a positive light result in a denial of aging?  
While difference is celebrated in axes such as race, gender, religion and nationality, the same is not 
true for age.  Researchers, in pathetic attempts aimed, one might suppose, at establishing 
acceptability of their subjects, plea for a blindness to difference: 
 old people are in fact young people inhabiting old bodies... Old people are people who have 
lived a certain number of years, and that is all (Alex Comfort cited in Thompson, et al, 1990: 
108).    
Old people are in fact young people? Really?  What happens to all the years they have lived, the 
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things they have learned, the selves they have evolved from and the selves they are becoming?  
Years are not empty containers: important things happen in that time. Why must these years be 
trivialized?  They are the stuff of which people's lives are made.     
 
In Western culture, "ageing well" is often code for minimalization of the aging process.  Being told 
that one does not look one' age is meant, and is usually taken as a complement, not an erasure of 
one's personal history.  However, Maggie Kuhn, the founder of the Grey Panthers in the United 
States, explains that "when people say to me that I'm 'eighty-six years young' I'm a bit offended... 
[because that] is to deny my history and all the things I've done and changes I've seen" (Berman and 
Goldman 1992:128).  Old age is often constructed as the absence of youth, and the former is only 
given value in as much as the latter can be detected within it.  But if development is the project of a 
lifetime (which I shall argue here it is) then surely age is in a fundamental sense an 
accomplishment, something one has worked long and hard at.  Why then do we not want it to be 
acknowledged?  Betty Friedan argues against agelessness: age cannot mean the absence of change, 
she tells us.  Old age is something different - and far from being problematic, it contains within 
itself its own distinct possibilities as well as its own challenges.    
 
In the context of Western culture, it is not surprising that the discipline of developmental 
psychology - which is quintessentially youth-centered - both reflects and reproduces this ageist 
ideology.  Although physical changes might be both more uniform and dramatic in the early years 
than at any other time in the life cycle, one cannot assume that change - either physical or 
psychological - is restricted to this time.  As the study of developmental psychology devotes 
virtually no attention to the adult years, the assumption is that development has ceased by this time. 
 21 
  
  
 
 
 
 Even Erik Erikson's model of so-called life span developmental psychology only devotes two of 
his eight stages to life beyond the adolescent years.  But this construction of the life course is one 
which is worth challenging. Thomae (1979) writes: "The 'mature' person who remains changeless 
and motionless in the face of the different challenges, threats, and increasing opportunities of the 
adult years is a stereotype, having no psychological reality" (p.294).  That change and growth in the 
later years are not accounted for in the literature of developmental psychology is a reflection of the 
society of which that literature is a product - nothing more and nothing less.  People develop as a 
response to the new challenges with which they are confronted in their daily lives.  It is evident that 
some of the most fundamental of these challenges come in the adult years.  Indeed, one could argue 
that the difficulties of late life are the very thing which make this phase of life ripe with opportunity 
for development.     Friedan speaks of the "developmental possibilities of age as a unique period of 
human life" (p.49)  She writes: 
 The qualities that may emerge in people who continue to develop after sixty-five are the 
uncharted terrain in studies of human aging.  Are there capacities that actually  improve or 
emerge with age? ... [If so] What would cause or prevent [their] emergence? (p. 49) 
Why are the qualities of old age the "uncharted terrain" in human development?  The answers 
which we come up with reflect the questions we ask. If we are only interested in how the later years 
might better resemble early years, then it is not surprising that we are oblivious to the 
developmental opportunities which they offer.  We live our lives as a play which is stripped of its 
final act.  Perhaps when we stop embracing agelessness at the exclusion of old age, when we 
celebrate age for what it is, we will be able to see in this time opportunities for "continued human 
development" (Friedan 1993: 51).   
 
How and what we name in our lives are ultimately political questions.  By denying our old their 
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rightful category we do not remedy the problems perpetrated by an ageist society, but rather help 
perpetuate them.  We must be able to call our old people old, acknowledge all the challenge and the 
possibility that their advanced years embody.  This acknowledgement of the power of age is 
epitomized by the description of an old woman offered by her husband: 
 She is not just an old woman, you know. She wears old age like a bunch of fresh-cut flowers. 
 She is old, advanced in years, vieja, but in Spanish we have another word for her - a word 
that tells you that she has grown with all those years.  I think that is something one ought to 
hope for and pray for and work for all during life: to grow, to become not only older but a 
bigger person.  She is old, all right, vieja, but I will dare say this in front of her: she is una 
anciana.  With that, I declare my respect....(Coles 1991:90-91). 
Old age can be, and with some people is, a growing into ourselves. We are still the same people 
who we always have been, but we are more deeply so.  This is not agelessness, but a radical 
reconstruction of successful ageing. 
 
The continuity theory of aging embodies some of these principles.  Atchley (1993) explains the 
essence of the theory: 
 Continuity theory is evolutionary.  It assumes that the patterns of ideas and skills, which 
people use to adapt and act, develop and persist over time; that a course of developmental 
direction can usually be identified; and that the individual's orientation is not to remain 
personally unchanged but rather consistent with the individual's past... (pp.5-6) 
Continuity is perceived of in terms of two dimensions: internal  - "the development and persistence 
over time of mental constructs about who we are, what we are capable of, and what is satisfying to 
us" (p. 15) - and external, demarcated by the activities in which we engage.  Critically, continuity 
theory points to old age as a time of ongoing personhood, neither the retardation or complete 
cessation of development, nor a radical transformation of self from 'us' to 'them.'  Old age is a 
continuation of the life which has been lived up until that point, "the previous life of the old people 
... acts as a background and context for their expectations and experience of old age"  (Featherstone 
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and Hepworth 1989:155). 
 
When old people talk about themselves, an expression of a continuity of self is often 
misapprehended as statement of agelessness, but the two are not the same. When the respondents in 
I Don't Feel Old reject the category of old age for themselves, they are not necessarily denying the 
importance of age in their self-perceptions as much as they are distancing themselves from a 
stultifying stereotype.  When Friedan first embarked upon her journey of reconciliation with age, 
she asked herself "why there was no image of age with which I could identify the person I am 
today... I asked myself how this dread of age fitted or distorted reality, making age so terrifying that 
we have to deny its very existence... (1993: 8-9).  The reconstruction of old age as time of 
agelessness is the epitome of such denial.   
 
Yet the lens of agelessness remains a seductive one.  Sharon Kaufman's The Ageless Self: Sources 
of Meaning in Late Life (1986) is a case in point.  For Kaufman, expression of a continuity of self is 
synonymous with agelessness.  Old people, she says "do not speak of being old as meaningful in 
itself" .... [Rather] they express a sense of self that is ageless - an identity that maintains continuity 
despite the physical and social changes that come with old age" (p.7).  The book is replete with 
stories of old people who continue to engage passionately with the world around them, ongoing 
people with ongoing lives.  Their key to constructing "current and viable" identities is "integration" 
- a word also favored by Friedan. This, Kaufman argues, is "the heart of the creative, symbolic 
process of self-formulation in late life" (p. 188), a process which allows us to appreciate "the 
complexity of human aging and the ultimate reality of coming to terms with one's whole life"  
(p.188). Many of her respondents, like those in I Don't Feel Old, reject old age as a category of any 
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significance to their own sense of self. But once again, this distancing is left unanalysed, as if it 
were unproblematic, rather than an expression of personal resistance to an oppressive mold.  She 
writes: 
 Contrary to popular conceptions of old age, which tend to define it as a distinct period in life, 
old people themselves emphasize the continuity of the ageless self amid changes across the 
life span.  Old people do not perceive meaning in aging itself, so much as they perceive 
meaning in being themselves in old age (pp. 13-14). 
That the old people with whom Kaufman spoke "perceive meaning in being themselves in old age" 
is evidence against the agelessness for which she argues.  Of course age in and of itself means 
nothing - and this is true of all phases in the life cycle.  It is rather the opportunity for the 
transformation of the self which accompanies the new age which is of significance. In the opening 
lines of "The Layers," poet Stanley Kunitz identifies the important interplay between change and 
continuity of self in the aging process: 
 
                  I have walked through many lives 
                  some of them my own, 
                  and I am not who I was, 
                  though some principle of being 
                  abides, from which I struggle not to stray.    
                                     (Fowler and McCutcheon 1991: 18) 
In old age, we remain in part the selves we have always been, even while we are transformed: "I am 
not who I was, though some principle of being abides."   
 
This presents researchers of aging with a particular challenge: they must find a way to locate and 
represent both the transformation and the continuity of the identity of the old people they study.  
Thus, rather than establishing a false binary between the positions 'you're only as old as you feel' 
(continuity), and 'you're as old as you are' (change), there is a grey area in which these positions 
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exist simultaneously.  Many old people feel that they are the same person deep inside as they have 
ever been (and might, therefore, express this in terms of 'not feeling old').  At the same time, they 
are changed by the years they have lived, not only physically, but psychologically.  Thus, old 
people's readings of their social world, and their positionings of themselves within it, is very 
nuanced, and it is the complexity of this perspective, complete with its apparent self-contradictions, 
which researchers must try to keep hold of as they proceed in their investigations. 
 
In my own work with old people (Andrews 1991), it is precisely this tension between change and 
continuity which lies at the core of my respondents' self identifications.  The women and men I 
interviewed - British lifetime socialists who had been politically active for fifty years or longer - 
were between the ages of seventy and ninety.  As they described themselves in old age, it was clear 
that their self-identities were both durable and dynamic.  The lives which they were leading in old 
age were a direct outgrowth of the whole of their lives leading up that point. As such, they 
experienced their old age as being full of purpose and meaning; for them it is the culminating 
chapter of a lifetime's work.  One respondent, Eileen, quotes Einstein, saying "the only constant is 
change." She sees in herself a progressive change, a deepening of her understanding of Marxism, 
but not a change which involves a rejection of the political ideas she embraced in her youth.  She 
explains: “If you have a philosophy like mine that is a political one... it obviously gets modified, but 
I think your basic beliefs stay the same... I still believe in progress, I still have my Marxism.”  She 
describes how she sees change in her own life.  She recalls going to see the Walt Disney film 
Fantasia, and listening to a Bach fugue, which corresponded to her perception of life. 
 That it was, the interchanging and the movements, and how changes occur.  What I was 
telling you about my own life, that it heaps up and suddenly it moves into something else and 
it weaves intricately and it gets lost and it gets stronger and finally there's a change. 
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One understanding grows out of another; earlier perspectives are enhanced, not replaced.  Another 
respondent, Edward, identifies a similar interplay between change and continuity. "I develop in 
understanding, but basically I don't think I've changed all that much." Later he asserts "I've a more 
realistic way of trying to work for socialism than I had earlier on. I think I've got a deeper 
understanding... they're the same values [as held earlier in life] but I hope I've grown in 
understanding how to work for them." 
 
Christopher's description is more expansive than those offered by the others: 
 I said just now that I believed politically speaking ... I'd arrived... I don't mean that I've arrived 
at some sort of plateau or summit of knowledge and understanding from which no further 
advance is possible.  That's an absurd notion, it's something not given to  humans... I simply 
mean that I think my general orientation is right, that I have before me the possibility of 
travelling intelligently... All we can do, as humans, is travel, and if I say 'I've arrived' I only 
mean I've arrived at... 'a path with heart'... a path which one can follow with the consent of all 
one's being. 
Christopher's development is a dynamic one, which involves the whole of himself.  It is not a 
casting off of a past self, but rather the expansion of a present one.   One respondent, Jack, echoes 
the sentiment expressed earlier by Maggie Kuhn. He says: "to get to eighty years without 
experience would be useless.  It would be a waste of eighty years."  These are not the words of 
someone who wishes to appear "ageless"; rather he regards his eighty years - a phrase which he 
repeats for effect - as a sign of his experience. They are his history.  Similarly, Rose speaks of 
"getting wiser through experience."  The years of their lives mark more than the mere passage of 
time; through these years they have become who they are. In some sense, the years belong to them.  
They cannot, and they must not, be taken away from them. 
 
Participants in my study had remained committed to socialist principles for at least fifty years; in 
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the words of Kunitz quoted earlier, their lives are characterized by an abiding "principle of being."  
And yet, also like Kunitz, they do not claim to be the exact same person who they have always 
been.  In Jack's words "that would be a waste of eighty years."  Eileen explains the relationship 
between change and continuity in her own life using the metaphor of a spiral, analogous to Kunitz's 
living in "the layers": "You don't come back, it isn't the wheel has come full circle.  You come in a 
spiral... Life doesn't go back to where it began, it comes up a bit further, and that's where you see 
progress."   Development for these men and women consists of their unfolding, a deepening of who 
they already were; it is the "integration" identified by Friedan and Kaufman.    
 
For my respondents, age represented both change and continuity.  Moreover, it is through the 
passage of time that they gain a perspective not only of who they are, but of who they have been.  
Elizabeth eloquently describes this process: 
 when you look back, you see the path or paths that you've taken.  The path would obviously 
not be so clear when you're groping up and finding it, would it?  I mean it's rather like going 
up a mountain, you're sort of looking that way and that track and it looks too steep and you're 
going round another one.  Whereas when you're high up you can look back and see and it sort 
of stands out much more clearly, things you didn't realize at the time. 
Age has given to Elizabeth the opportunity to be "high up" where she can look back over her life 
with a new ability to see and to understand, a depth of perspective not available to her in her earlier 
years, when she was "groping" to find her way.  Perhaps it is this deepening of the self which is the 
real gift of age, one of the "capacities that actually improve or emerge with age" (1993:49) which 
Friedan was seeking. 
 
Shifting the Center 
Andersen and Collins (1995) make a strong case for what they call "shifting the center" or "putting 
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at the center of our thinking the experiences of groups who have  formerly been excluded" (p.2).  
Oppressed or marginalized groups of people are often judged by the experiences of their oppressor,  
 rather than being understood on their own terms; this establishes a false norm through which 
all groups are judged... Shifting the center is a shift in stance that illuminates the experiences 
of not only the oppressed groups but also of those in the dominant culture (Ibid.) 
The youth-orientation of our culture hinders us from perceiving value in age; aging is successful in 
as much as it is "youthful."   Friedan's plea for a "revolutionary paradigm shift" (1993: 51) seems 
well-founded.  A deep understanding of the ageing process will only be possible when we start and 
end our investigations with an acceptance of age.  We must fight for a study of ageing which has 
not only old people but old age at its centre.  So long as investigators build their safe fences 
between "us" and "them" our understanding of the selves who we are in the process of becoming 
will always be limited.  Time and again old people say they experience the ageing process as a 
continuation of being themselves: their lives are ongoing.  But this is not "agelessness."  People see 
value in the years they have lived; without them they have no history, they have no genuine self.  
 
Haim Hazan writes: 
 The inaccessibility of the experience of being old, coupled with the inadequacy of available 
conceptual frameworks, calls for an entirely different kind of approach to the acquisition of 
knowledge about ageing... The importance of gerontology is not in its substantive 
contribution to the understanding of the nature of old age but in its allusion to the limits of 
our knowledge of the essence of human existence.  The main instructive value of seeking 
knowledge of ageing is the potential it offers for facilitating an untried and vanguard 
experiment in unlearning and debunking (1994:94). 
We need a different way to think and learn about ageing.  What will it take for us to "recognize 
ourselves in this old man or in that old woman" (deBeauvoir 1970:12).  Can we not move beyond 
the us and them distinction, or is our ability to know invariably limited to that which we have 
experienced?  The "unlearning" and "debunking" which Hazan argues for is the crucial first step in 
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this process, without which there can be no progress. We must ask ourselves hard questions: what 
does our culture teach us about the meaning, or the lack of meaning, of ageing?  How can we learn 
about the selves we will become?  We must listen to what the old have to say about being 
themselves in old age, in all of its complexity.  The implications for the study of ageing are clear; 
the problems are real but not insurmountable.  The challenge and the promise of this work are 
summarized by Lawrence Kohlberg: 
 ... if an aging person has developed some wisdom we do not have, it is hard for younger 
researchers to detect it...If some aging persons do attain a greater wisdom, then among the 
most important things a student of aging could do is to clarify and communicate that wisdom 
to others. This means that the student of aging needs to be not only a psychologist and a 
sociologist but also a philosopher (Kohlberg and Shulik 1981: 72). 
 
Researchers of ageing must learn to resist the temptation of agelessness.  Ironically, this denial of 
difference, the erasure of the years lived, further entrenches the barrier between 'us' and 'them,' as it 
strips the old of their history and leaves them with nothing to offer but a mimicry of their youth.  
Thus the cycle continues: the young are divided from the old, and the old are divided within 
themselves, pitting body and soul against each other as if they were not part of one whole.  But it is 
not old age which is thus conquered, but our very selves. 
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